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Abstract
Taxes aﬀect the individual’s educational choice through many channels, and they
have both direct and indirect eﬀects on human capital accumulation. The structure
of the tax system creates diﬀerent incentive eﬀects that distorts the individual’s ed-
ucational choice. Some of these tax eﬀects discourage higher education, while others
encourage it. I give an overview over the existing literature on taxes and education
and also provide the intuition for many of these partial eﬀects in a simple model. The
total eﬀect of taxes on education is ambiguous.
JEL codes: H24; I21; J24.
1 Introduction
Education is both investment and consumption. The return to the educational investment
is a higher wage later in life, and this wage return is reduces by income taxes. This af-
fects the relative attractiveness of education compared with other investment alternatives.
Therefore income taxes aﬀect the duration of the individual’s education. Diﬀerent types
of education yield diﬀerent rates of wage return, such that taxes might also aﬀect the
individual’s educational portfolio. The price on education as a consumption good consists
both of foregone wages during the educational process and of future foregone earnings by
not choosing a profession that yields higher wages. In addition, income taxes reduce the
after-tax price on education and might aﬀect the level of educational consumption. The
after-tax price on educational consumption varies across educational types, since diﬀerent
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types of education yield diﬀerent rates of wage return. Thus income taxes might also aﬀect
the individual’s portfolio of educational consumption.
Taxes aﬀect the individual’s educational choice through many channels, and I present
a simple model to illustrate diﬀerent partial tax eﬀects on education. A proportional tax
on wage income has by itself no eﬀect on the human capital accumulation, while it in
presence of other eﬀects create distortions. Educational attainment is increased by a tax
on capital income and by non-pecuniary returns to education. On the opposite, direct
and non-pecuniary costs of education, and a progressive wage tax reduce educational
attainment. The conclusion is that these eﬀects go in diﬀerent directions, such that the
total eﬀect of taxes on education depends on the individual’s preferences.
Not only the wage return to education is important to determine the level of educational
investments. I present Norwegian data that indicate that the optimal educational level
may change if the full after-tax lifetime income is used to assess the return to diﬀerent
educational levels..
1.1 The structure of taxation.
Which is the best tax structure, and how should tax revenue be spent? The answers to
these questions depend strongly on the preferences towards inequality. Egalitarian coun-
tries, such as the Nordic countries, traditionally put strong emphasis on equality and on
having a large welfare state. These countries have a progressive tax structure to ensure
redistribution, and they have a high level of overall taxation to finance a high level of
publicly financed welfare goods. Other countries such, as the U.S., put stronger empha-
sis on individual freedom and on minimizing the role of the state. Such countries have
less progressive income taxation, a lower overall tax level, and a lower level and range of
publicly provided goods.
As we see in figure 1, countries diﬀer also in how tax revenue is generated, and in
whether individuals or firms carry the larger tax burden. Assume that revenue is spent on
public consumption and transfers to individuals. Then a high level of taxation indicates a
large public sector and broad welfare system.
1.2 The structure of education.
Prior to the human capital revolution in the 1960ies education was considered to be a
cultural good that made individuals better citizens. Schultz (1960) and Becker (1964)
introduced the idea that human capital investments increase productivity. The basic in-
tuition is that the eﬀect of one hour of labor is not the same across individuals, but that
2
Figure 1: Total tax revenue as % of GDP, 2000. Source: OECD.
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the eﬀective hour of labor might increase through making investments in the worker. Dif-
ferent activities increase the individual’s human capital, such as health service, migration,
on-the-job training, and education.
The educational structure varies greatly across countries, both regarding who supplies
education and who attends it. For instance, in 2001 only 6% of the adult population in
Mexico had higher education, while 42% had higher education in Canada1. At the same
time the overall spending on higher education varies greatly across countries. Canada and
the US by far have the largest spending on higher education. In 2001, 2.7% of GDP was
spent on higher education in the US, and only one third of this was public spending. In
contrast, the Nordic countries spent 1.3% - 1.8 % of GDP on higher education, and nearly
all of this are public spending.
The wage return to education varies considerably across countries. While one additional
year of higher education yields a wage return of 8-10 % in the U.S. (Card 1999), it only
yields a wage return of 4-6% in Norway (Hægeland et al. 1999).
Education is a wide concept. In this paper education means higher education, that
is post-high school education. There is a variety of diﬀerent types of higher education
to choose from, and they diﬀer in content, requirements regarding ability and eﬀort, as
well as in return. In the greater part of this paper, though, education is assumed to be
homogenous. Let us now discuss what determines the individual’s educational choice in
the first place.
1The corresponding numbers for the Scandinavian countries are 31% in Norway, 33% in Sweden, and
27% in Denmark. Source: OECD Education at a glance.
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1.3 Determinants for the educational choice.
The individual’s educational choice is mainly determined by his preferences and abilities.
When making his educational choice, the individual makes a trade-oﬀ between the expected
costs and expected returns to education. The costs of the educational investment consists
of the eﬀort and time he has to put in to complete the education, as well as foregone
labor income and direct costs such as tuition fees. The returns to education consists both
of pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns. Pecuniary returns are wage, fringe benefits, and
other types of compensation that could instead have been paid directly as wages. Non-
pecuniary returns are types of return that cannot be replaced directly by higher wages,
such as status, job-satisfaction, good job environments, and the direct utility gain, which
I call the consumption value of education2.
The individual’s abilities determine the level of eﬀort and time required to complete
the education. The higher his abilities, the lower the costs, and the higher the wage return.
His preferences determine which factors he values higher in this trade-oﬀ between costs
and returns, and which types of returns to education he values higher, pecuniary or non-
pecuniary returns.
1.4 Risk.
Education is an investment and a means to shift income between periods, in the same
way as financial capital and real capital investments. One fact that is often ignored is
that human capital investments are in some sense more risky than financial or real capital
investments.
Human capital is inseparable from its owner and cannot be traded in the market, and
thus the investment cannot be capitalized. The possibilities to diversify human capital
investments are limited compared with the diversification possibilities of financial capital
investments. When making his educational choice, the individual has full freedom and may
choose from a large range of alternatives. But after the completion of the education, he
has invested in a particular type of skills, such that there exists a potential lock-in eﬀect
her.
In contrast to financial capital investments, which generate a future return independent
of the individual’s actions once the investment has been made, human capital investments
require labor eﬀort in order to generate any return. Human capital investments generate
no return if the individual is unemployed or disabled and cannot work.
2See Alstadsæter (2004) for a thorough discussion of the consumption value of education.
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Since there is a long lag from the educational investment decision is made to any returns
may be generated, the individual makes his educational choice based on the expected wage
return and the expected situation in the future labor market. Many factors can change
the actual outcome of the investment, in that they alter the demand for skilled labor,
change the wage level, or aﬀect the individual’s health. All factors aﬀect the individual’s
unemployment probability and thus also the utilization of the human capital investment
and its rate of return. The larger the uncertainty, the greater the risk of human capital
investments, and the higher must the expected rate of return be in order to induce the
individual to acquire higher education.
But one might also argue that higher education makes the individual more flexible and
able to fill diﬀerent types of positions, such that education actually reduces the future
systematic income risk.
1.5 Distortions to the educational choice
The individual acquires the level of education that maximizes his utility. In the absence of
a consumption value of education, this means that he chooses the educational level that
maximizes the present value of his income stream. This is also the optimal educational
level for the society, and the level of education that maximizes productivity. Which factors
can then distort his educational choice and generate an ineﬃcient level of human capital
in the society?
If there are imperfect capital markets, the liquidity constrained individual cannot bor-
row to finance his living expenses and other costs of education, and thus he acquires a
level of human capital below the optimal. In the presence of income risk the risk averse
individual under-invests in education if he cannot insure himself against the future income
risk.
Supply-side eﬀects also distort the individual’s educational choice. If the supply of
education is rationed, this restricts the individual from acquiring his optimal level of
education. A distorted wage setting process might reduce the wage return to education
and thus also the incentives to acquire higher education. An example of this is monopsony
power of the employer, such that he can set the wage artificially low. This can be seen
in the labor market for nurses in Norway, where the public sector basically is the only
employer and thus pushes down the wage. A centralized wage setting process can have
a similar eﬀect, where strong labor unions prioritize wage increases for the low-skilled at
the expense of wage increases for the high-skilled. This reduces the wage dispersion in the
economy and thus also the wage return to higher education.
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The last distortive element in the individual’s educational decision process is income
taxes, which reduce the individual’s wage return to education and introduce a tax wedge
between the social and private return to education. Let us now take a closer look at how
the structure of income taxation aﬀects the individual’s educational choice.
2 Tax distortions to the individual’s educational choice
The overall structure and level of the tax system governs the level of public revenue and
thus also public expenditure. In turn this determines the level of public transfers to the
individual in case of unemployment, sickness or disablement. The larger the welfare state,
and the higher these transfers, the lower the future income risk, and the greater are the
incentives to acquire higher education. Also, the overall structure of the tax system and the
organization of public expenditures determine the level of public versus private financing of
higher education, which aﬀects the liquidity constrained individual’s possibilities to invest
in higher education.
The structure of the income tax system might also aﬀect the level of the before-tax
market wage. There is considerable empirical evidence that a progressive wage tax might
in fact reduce before-tax inequality. A survey of this literature is given by Røed and Strøm
(2002). But the opposite may also be the case, as Persson and Sandmo (2002) show.
In the following I will concentrate on the third channel for tax eﬀects on education,
namely how the income tax determines the after-tax wage when the before-tax wage is
given. There is a disagreement in the tax literature on whether or not one ought to tax
the return to human capital investments, and on how taxes aﬀect the incentives to acquire
higher education. For instance, Heckman (1976) argues that taxes encourage human capital
accumulation, while Trostel (1993) argues the opposite. Income taxes alter the after-tax
wage return to education through diﬀerent channels. The reason why authors conclude
diﬀerently on whether taxes encourage or discourage education is that they study diﬀerent
partial eﬀects. I will now provide the intuition for these partial eﬀects in a simple model.
2.1 A simple model.
Apply an extended version of the simple two-period representative agent model of Jacobs
(2002) in a small open economy. The real interest rate, r, is given, as is the real wage
that is normalized to 1. The individual can increase his second period income by either
investing in the financial market, where the return is given by the real interest rate, or by
investing in education, which yields a wage return in the second period.
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Let the return to educational investments E be given by the function g(E), which here
has the functional form Eβ. The larger β is, the higher is the wage return to educational
investments. Note that 0 < β < 1. The duration of each period is normalized to 1, such
that 0 < E < 1 is the fraction of first period that is spent acquiring education. The
remaining time is spent working as an unskilled worker.
The net of taxes first period wage income is invested in the capital market. The costs of
acquiring higher education is foregone labor income, as well as direct monetary outlays for
tuition fees, books, etc. as a fixed proportion k of first period income per unit of education.
Total non-deductible direct costs of education are given by k · E. Capital markets are
assumed to be perfect, such that the individual can borrow to finance the direct costs of
education. Leisure in the first period is given. In the second period, however, leisure L2 is
endogenously determined, and it is measured as a fraction of available time. Time spent
working in the second period is given by (1− L2).
Let the income tax system be dual3, such that the tax rate on capital income, τ , and
the tax rate on labor income, t, can diﬀer. Allow for the possibility of progressive labor
income taxation, such that a two-tariﬀ rate is required. Let t1 be the basic tax rate, and let
t2 be the top tax rate that applies if labor income is above a given threshold I. First period
labor income is always below I, such that only the basic tax rate applies. The educated
individual always generates a labor income above the threshold, such that the top tax rate
applies to part of his labor income. If t1 = t2 labor income taxation is proportional, and
if t1 < t2 labor income taxation is progressive.
Now consider the individual’s budget constraints. First period consumption is zero,
and thus first period saving S in the financial market is given by labor income net of taxes
and educational expenditures:
S = (1− t1) · (1−E)− k ·E (1)
Second period consumption, C2, is given by net of taxes labor income and savings:
C2 = (1− t1) · I + (1− t2) ·
q
(1− L2) · Eβ − I
r
+ {1 + (1− τ) · r} · S (2)
The more education he acquires in the first period, the higher is his wage return to ed-
ucation and the higher share of his wage income is taxed according to the top tax. On
the other hand, the higher his educational level, the lower are his savings in the financial
market.
3See Sørensen (1998) for more on the dual income tax.
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The individual enjoys both second period consumption and leisure. The non-pecuniary
return to education is represented through the taste parameter γ. If γ > 0, the individual
has a positive consumption value of education, and if γ < 0, the consumption value of
education is negative. In the case that γ = 0, then education is a pure investment and yields
no non-pecuniary returns. In order to isolate the various tax eﬀects on the individual’s
educational choice, let his utility function have the following specific functional form4:
U(C2, L2, E) = C2 + γ · E − (1− L2)
1+ 1ε
1 + 1ε
(3)
Remember that (1−L2) is the second period labor supply, and as utility depends positively
on the amount of leisure, it depends negatively on the amount of time spent working. The
wage elasticity of the labor supply is represented by the parameter ε. The greater this
elasticity, the larger is the eﬀect on the individual’s labor supply by a change in the after
tax wage.
The individual’s discount rate is the after tax real interest rate. When he at the begin-
ning of the first period decides how much education to acquire, he maximizes his utility
function (3) subject to the present value of the life-time consumption (1) and (2). It can
be shown that the individual’s level of educational attainment then is given by E, which
is a function of taxes, the rates of return to the two investment alternatives, as well as the
wage elasticity of labor supply:
E =
+
β · (1− t2)1+ε
[1 + (1− τ) · r] · [1− t1 + k]− γ
, 1
1−(1+ε)·β
(4)
The diﬀerent tax rates have diﬀerent eﬀects which go in opposite directions. Let us
now take a closer look at each of these tax induced distortions to the educational choice.
Proportional wage tax. Now consider the eﬀect of a proportional income tax. Isolate
this eﬀect by assuming no tuition fees, k = 0, no non-pecuniary returns to education, γ = 0,
exogenously given labor supply in the second period, ε = 0, and no tax on capital income,
τ = 0. Labor income taxation is proportional, such that t1 = t2 = t. The individual’s
demand function for education (4) then reduces to:
4 I could instead have analyzed this on a general utility function. That would nevertheless not have
provided the immediate intuitive tax eﬀects on the individual’s demand for higher education. Thus I
choose to use this very specific functional form in order to immediately illustrate the various eﬀects that
have been derived from general utility functions in the reference papers.
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E =
 β
1 + r
 1
1−β
(5)
The amount of education that the individual chooses to acquire depends on the present
value of the return to the investments, and there are no tax-induced distortions to his
educational choice. The higher the return factor β to education is, the more education he
acquires. A high return to financial investments, r, makes financial investments relatively
more attractive and reduces education.
But why doesn’t the wage tax aﬀect the individual’s investment decision? A propor-
tional tax on labor income taxes the cost of the educational investment, which here is
foregone labor income, at the same rate as the return to the investment, which is sec-
ond period labor income. As is shown by Sandmo (1979), a neutral cash flow tax of this
kind levies zero marginal tax on the return to educational investments. Thus, a propor-
tional tax on labor income induces no distortions to the individual’s choice of educational
investments. This was first shown by Boskin (1975).
But the neutrality of the proportional wage tax brakes down if other eﬀects are present.
Proportional income tax Next, consider the case where a positive proportional tax
on capital income exists along with the wage tax, such that τ > 0 and t1 = t2 = t. We
still disregard other complicating eﬀects and assume that there are no tuition fees, k = 0,
no non-pecuniary returns to education, γ = 0, and that labor supply in the second period
is exogenously given, ε = 0. The demand for education is then given by
E =
 β
1 + (1− τ) · r
 1
1−β
(6)
As we see, the tax on capital income creates distortions in the individual’s investment
decision and induces him to spend more of his time in the first period on education than
he would have done in the absence of tax on capital income. There are three reasons for
this. First, tax on capital income reduces the return to financial capital investments and
increases the relative return to human capital investments. Second, a tax on capital income
reduces the discount factor and increases the present value of the return to education.
And third, a tax on capital income reduces the costs of borrowing, provided that the tax
system is symmetric. Thus the conclusion here is that a tax on capital income distorts the
individual’s investment decision in favor of human capital investments. This is shown by
Driﬃll and Rosen (1983), and Nielsen and Sørensen (1997).
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A proportional wage tax is a neutral tax on the return to human capital investments
as long as there is no tax on capital income. A proportional tax on all income induces the
individual to over-invest in human capital from a social point of view, which is the result
of Heckman (1976).
Direct costs of education. Now consider the eﬀect of taxes on the educational level in
the presence of direct costs of education, k > 0. To simplify, let there be no tax on capital
income, τ = 0, a proportional wage tax, t1 = t2 = t, exogenously given labor supply, ε = 0,
and no non-pecuniary returns to education, γ = 0. We see from the demand function for
education below that a proportional wage tax no longer is neutral since the direct costs
of acquiring education in the first period are non-deductible:
E =



β
[1 + r] ·
k
1 + k1−t
l



1
1−β
(7)
Tax on labor income reduces total costs of the educational investments, which is the sum
of foregone labor income and direct monetary outlays, at a lower rate than the return to
the investments. The proportional tax on labor income thus discourages human capital
investments and leads to under-invest in education in the presence of non-deductible direct
costs of education. This conclusion is drawn by among others Trostel (1993), Nerlove et
al. (1993), and Jacobs (2003).
Another direct cost of educational investments is the non-deductible depreciation of
human capital. As Nerlove et al. argue, human capital is inseparable from its owner,
and it thus depreciates to zero at death. They consider the choice of investing in human
capital or in real capital, where the depreciation of real capital is tax deductible. Including
human capital depreciation as a cost of acquiring education, they conclude that even a
proportional income tax on both labor and capital income discriminates against human
capital investments and lowers productivity in the society.
If direct costs of educational investments are tax deductible, this tax induced distor-
tion disappears. Alternatively, the government can eliminate the distortion through direct
educational subsidies. Heckman (1976) assumes that direct costs are in fact deductible, so
the tax induced distortion of non-deductible direct costs does not appear in his analysis.
Non-pecuniary returns to education. Higher wage in the future is not the only
motivation for acquiring higher education. As we now will show, the presence of non-
pecuniary returns or costs to education, γ 9= 0, destroys the neutrality of the proportional
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wage tax. Consider the simple case of a proportional wage tax, t1 = t2 = t, no tax on
capital income, τ = 0, no tuition fees, k = 0, and exogenously given labor supply in the
second period , ε = 0. The individual’s demand function for education (4) then reduces
to:
E =
+
β
1 + r − γ1−t
, 1
1−β
(8)
The presence of a proportional tax on wage income exaggerates the importance of the
non-pecuniary returns or costs of education. First, consider the case where there are non-
pecuniary costs of education, γ < 0, such that the individual considers education to be a
consumption bad. These costs are non-deductible. As in the above case with non-deductible
direct costs of education, the wage tax reduces the return to education at a higher rate
than the costs, inducing the individual to choose less education than in the absence of
taxes.
On the other hand, if the consumption value of education is positive, γ > 0, the result
is the opposite. The proportional wage tax now increases demand for education, since the
non-pecuniary returns to education are tax-exempt. The cost of education, which is the
foregone labor income, is taxed at a higher rate than the total return to education, which
is the sum of the taxed wage return and the untaxed consumption value. The proportional
wage tax serves as a tax subsidy on the consumption value of education and induces the
individual to over-invest in education. This is shown by Alstadsæter (2003a).
Proportional wage tax when labor supply is endogenous . Let us now find the
eﬀect of taxes on educational attainment when labor supply and second period leisure are
endogenously determined, such that ε > 0. Assume no direct costs of education, k = 0, no
tax on capital income, τ = 0, proportional wage tax, t1 = t2 = t, and no non-pecuniary
returns, γ = 0. Also in this case the neutrality of the proportional wage tax breaks down:
E =
 β
1 + r
· (1− t)ε
 1
1−(1+ε)·β
(9)
A tax on labor income reduces the price on second period leisure, measured in foregone
labor income, and it thus reduces the second period labor supply. Thus, as the hours
worked decreases, the utilization of the educational investment decreases, as does the
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return to education. This reduces investments in education5. The eﬀect is even stronger in
if the labor income tax is progressive. This eﬀect from labor supply is highlighted by Lucas
(1990), Lin (1998), and Jacobs (2003). Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) show in a special case
that the neutrality of the proportional wage tax can still hold even when labor supply is
endogenous.
Progressive wage tax. Finally, consider the eﬀect of progressive wage tax, t1 < t2. To
separate this eﬀect from all the other eﬀects, consider this in the absence of any capital
income tax, such that τ = 0. Also, let there be no direct costs of education, k = 0, no labor
supply eﬀects of taxation, ε = 0, and no non-pecuniary returns to education, γ = 0. The
individual’s demand for education is then determined by the present value of the return
to education, as well as by the degree of progressivity in the tax system:
E =
 β
1 + r
· 1− t2
1− t1
 1
1−β
. (10)
A progressive wage tax reduces the return to educational investments more than the
cost of the investment, which is foregone labor income in the first period. This reduces
the return to human capital investments and increases the relative return to financial
capital investments. Thus, a progressive labor income tax discriminates against human
capital investments and induces the individual to under-invest in human capital. This
investment disincentive is stronger the more progressive the labor income tax is. The more
progressive the tax system is, the smaller is the fraction 1−t21−t1 , and the lower is the demand
for educational investment. This eﬀect is shown by among others Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997), and Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998)
A tax on capital income induces the individual to invest more in human capital, such
that the eﬀect of progressive labor income taxes on the educational level is ambiguous in
the presence of capital income taxation, as shown by Sgontz (1982).
Summary We have shown that the tax system induces several distortions to the in-
dividual’s educational choice, and that these distortions go in diﬀerent directions. The
diﬀerent partial eﬀects are as follows:
5Only substitution eﬀects of taxes on labor supply are present in this simple model, no income eﬀects.
The presence of the income eﬀect makes the conclusion here ambiguous.
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Eﬀect on education
Proportional wage tax 0
Proportional capital income tax +
Proportional income tax +
Proportional wage tax and direct costs of education −
Proportional wage tax and non-pecuniary returns to education +
Proportional wage tax and non-pecuniary costs of education −
Proportional wage tax when labor supply is endogenous −
Progressive wage tax −
Progressive tax on labor income discourages educational investments, while tax on
capital income encourage them. A proportional tax on labor income is in itself neutral,
but in the presence of other eﬀects, such as direct costs of education, non-pecuniary returns
to education, capital income taxation, and endogenous labor supply the proportional wage
tax still introduces distortions.
All these eﬀects partly neutralize each other. Whether or not this tax system induces
the individual to acquire more or less education than in the absence of taxes depends on
the relative sizes of the tax rates and on the individual’s preferences.
But there are other eﬀects of taxes on the individual’s educational choice that we have
not captured in this simple model. Let us now take a look at them.
2.2 Other eﬀects of taxes on education.
Risk. One important extension is the inclusion of risk. Human capital is inseparable
from its owner and cannot be traded in the market. The return to education depends on
the labor supply of the individual, and if unemployed, he receives no return to human
capital investments. There are limited possibilities for diversification in the human capital
investments in order to reduce this risk. The only option for diversification is to acquire
a combination of general and sector specific human capital. Rosen (1980) shows that in
the presence of uncertain future wage return to education, taxes might actually increase
educational attainment. The intuition for this is that income taxes reduce the future
income variance. Thus taxes reduce the income uncertainty and encourage human capital
investments.
This model is extended by Kreider (2003) to consider the eﬀect of tax on human
capital investments when labor supply is endogenous and there are social security payments
to unemployed. He finds that young individuals under-invest in education, since they, if
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educated, would have to pay income-based transfers to non-workers, and these transfers
are not adjusted for the cost of the educational investment. In addition to all these eﬀects,
labor income taxes generate a negative income eﬀect that could reduce the individual’s
willingness to take risk, and thus reduce the individual’s educational investments. This
eﬀect depends on the assumption that the individual has decreasing risk aversion in income.
Social security. Unemployment benefits through the social security system reduce the
future income loss in case of unemployment. Brown and Kaufold (1988) show that if
unemployment insurance is financed as a proportional pay-roll tax and unemployment
benefits are link to paid contributions, the presence of the unemployment insurance might
increase educational attainment. The intuition is that the unemployment insurance shifts
income from the good state, where the individual is employed, to the bad state, where he is
unemployed, thus reducing the income risk. Similarly, Lau and Poutvaara (2001) find that
in the absence of risk, the structure of old age pension benefits from the social security
system aﬀect the individual’s educational investment. A system where pension benefits
are linked to age as well as paid social security contributions might actually increase
educational attainment.
Tax evasion. Tax evasion is a well-studied topic in the tax literature, but only Kolm and
Larsen (2004) include evasion motives when analyzing the eﬀects of taxes on the individ-
ual’s educational attainment. They analyze the eﬀects of taxes on educational attainment
when higher taxes encourage participation in the informal economy and tax evasion. Only
unskilled individuals can work in the informal sector. The higher the wage taxes, the
stronger the incentives to participate in the informal sector, and the lower is the return
to education. In this context, even a proportional wage tax reduces educational attain-
ment. They also show that a higher punishment for tax evasion can increase educational
attainment.
Heterogenous education. Until now, we have assumed that education is homogenous,
which obviously is a very simplifying assumption. Alstadsæter (2003b) shows that if the
individual can choose between educational types that diﬀer in wage return and in con-
sumption value, then a progressive wage tax might induce the individual to choose more
of the educational type with the higher consumption value. The tax reduces the price on
the consumption value of education, measured in foregone labor income by not choosing
the educational type that generates the higher wage return. Malchow-Møller and Skaksen
(2003) reach the same conclusion in an general equilibrium expansion of this model.
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Figure 2: Number of students enrolled at universities and colleges in Norway in the period
1985-2001.
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3 Empirical tax eﬀects on education.
Already 25 years ago, Sgontz (1989) pointed out that there the lack of empirical analysis
of tax eﬀects on human capital accumulation, and many authors of theoretical papers have
joined in his call for empirical facts on this issue. In spite of this, the empirical literature
of tax eﬀects on education is basically non-existing. Fredriksson (1997) finds that the
educational attainment of young Swedish individuals to a large extent seems to respond
to economic incentives, such as the after-tax wage of educated individuals. But the only
major attempt to find empirical eﬀects of income taxes on the educational attainment
is done by Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998, 1999) and Taber (2002) in a series of
general equilibrium models. They estimate individual parameters such as ability and level
of human capital based on micro panel data, and simulate the eﬀects of a tax reform
on educational attainment. They find that progressive labor income taxes in combination
with a proportional capital income tax6 have a small negative eﬀect on human capital
accumulation in the long run, while the short-lived short run eﬀect is larger.
Let me illustrate with an example why it is so diﬃcult to identify any eﬀects of taxes on
education. The Norwegian 1992 tax reform broadened the tax base and reduced marginal
tax rates. It also represented a shift from global progressive income tax to a dual income
tax7. The Nordic dual income tax combines a low proportional capital income tax with a
progressive labor income tax. Can we find any eﬀect of this tax reform on the educational
attainment? As we see from figure 2, the number of students enrolled at Norwegian colleges
and universities increased steadily with 150% from 1985 to 2001. At first glance the 1992
6As in the Nordic dual income tax.
7While a global income tax applies one tax schedule on the sum of income from all soucres, the dual
income tax taxes income from capital and labor separately. See Sørensen (1998) for more on the dual
income tax.
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tax reform does not appear to have any eﬀect on the aggregate educational attainment
beyond the positive trend that already existed. The supply of higher education is limited
and governed by public policy. The increase in educational attainment during the early
1990ies was to a large extent caused by an expansion of the educational sector and the
following relaxation of the rationing. Around 1990 Norway experienced a recession, and
many of the young individuals who previously would have started working directly after
high school now acquired education in order to improve their skills and their competitive-
ness on a tightening labor market. Also, there has been an upward shift in the minimum
educational requirements to be considered for diﬀerent types of jobs. The requirements
for education to function as a signal of good skills has increased over time, pushing the
educational level up. Another factor that complicate the identification of the tax eﬀect is
the long lag from when the educational decision is made to when the return to education
is collected. So even if we cannot immediately see any eﬀect of the 1992 tax reform on the
educational attainment, it does not mean that it had no eﬀect.
4 Tax eﬀects on the return to diﬀerent education levels.
The educational choice is often not a continuos choice of how many years of higher educa-
tion to acquire, rather than a discrete choice between diﬀerent levels of education. In most
cases, the individual has to complete a degree in order to get any return to the educa-
tional investment. So which educational level should the young individual choose? As we
have already discussed, many factors aﬀect the individual’s educational choice. Assume
for now that there are no non-pecuniary returns to education, and that all individuals
have the same innate ability level. Then the answer would be to choose the educational
level that yields the highest return. But as is shown below, the optimal educational level
might depend on how the return to education is measured. Let us consider this in the
two-period framework of section 2. During the first period the individual either works or
acquires education, and during the second period he works. Assume that the first period
lasts from the age 19 to age 29, and that second period lasts from age 30 to age 558.
Figure 3 shows the 2002 average wage of all Norwegian employees9 aged 30-55 who
at least have completed high school. This is a total of 785 728 individuals, and their
distribution of highest completed education is as follows: 372 152 have high school, 319
8 In order to avoid the problems introduces by the retirement decision, only prime aged individuals are
consideres in the second period.
9An individual is defined as employee if he works at least two months during the year, which here
corresponds to a wage income of NOK 50.000, and who is not self-employed.
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Figure 3: Average annual wage at diﬀerent educational levels. All Norwegian employees
aged 30-55, 2002.
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54
PhD
Master's
degree
Bachelor's
degree
High school
Age
NOK
893 have a Bachelor’s degree, 84 800 have a master’s degree, and 7 883 have a Ph.D.
These wage profiles can be considered as the expected lifetime wage profiles for the young
individual who in 2002 makes his choice of educational level. Disregard all complicating
factors and assume homogenous innate abilities and no liquidity constraints10 The advice
to the young individual is clear: A Ph.D. generates the highest wage return during the
second period, and thus you should choose this educational level.
In figure 3, progressive wage taxes would aﬀect the relative return to the diﬀerent
educational levels, but the ranking of the diﬀerent educational levels would still be the
same, with Ph.D. generating the highest after-tax wage return. Thus a progressive wage
tax would in this context not aﬀect his educational choice. But if he acquires a Ph.D., he
has to spend at least nine more years at school than if he starts working directly after
high school. During this time he borrows to finance living expenses and direct costs of
education11, a debt that has to be repaid during the second period. At the same time, the
high school graduate may work during these nine years and invest part of his income in
the financial market, an investment that generates returns during the second period. If the
return to financial investments is taken into account, a Ph.D. not necessarily generates
the highest lifetime income. This might aﬀect the ranking of the diﬀerent investment
alternatives. As diﬀerent income types are taxed diﬀerently, the tax system could actually
aﬀect not only the relative after-tax income at the diﬀerent educational levels, but also the
10The young Norwegian individual experiences no or only very weak liquidity constraints when making
his educaitonal chocie. This is due to the absence of tuition fees (most higher education is publicly financed)
and the presence of a highly subsidiezed student loan available to all students.
11Here assume that there are no bequests and financial transfers from family.
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Figure 4: Average total after-tax income from all sources at diﬀerent educational levels.
All Norwegian employees aged 30-55, 2002.
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Figure 5: Percentage increase in present value of second period income (age 30-55) at age
19 by acquiring a higher educational level compared with only having high school. Calculated
at 5 % discount rate, based on average incomes at diﬀerent educational levels by age group
in Norway, 2002.
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ranking among them. As we see in figure 412, when total after-tax income is considered, a
Ph.D. not necessarily generates the highest lifetime income. A master’s degree generates
nearly the same lifetime income. It nevertheless seems like higher education still pays oﬀ.
A Master’s degree is the educational level that contributes to the largest positive increase
in after-tax income.
As we see in the table in figure 5, the present value of the lifetime income at diﬀerent
educational levels decreases substantially when the after-tax income from all sources is
12The diﬀerent spikes in the wage profiles is due to outliers in capital income. In particular, remember
that the 2000-2001 dividend tax was removed January 1st 2002, prompting a timing eﬀect and an increase
in dividend payments. These are only averages, and no attempt has been made to remove these spikes.
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considered instead of only before-tax wage income. The return to the diﬀerent educational
levels are measured in increased present value of the second period income stream com-
pared with having only high school. The individual makes all choices in order to maximize
his utility, where education is only one choice among others, and where the wage return
to education is one among many decision variables behind the educational choice. Thus,
only considering the wage return when analyzing the tax eﬀects on education only gives
part of the total picture.
5 Summary
Income taxes have several diﬀerent partial eﬀects on the individual’s educational choice
that go in diﬀerent directions. We have shown that a proportional wage tax is a neutral tax
on the return to higher education, but that this eﬀect breaks down in the presence of other
taxes. A tax on capital income increases educational attainment, as does the presence of
non-pecuniary returns to education. A social security system where benefits are linked
to paid contributions also encourage education. Both pecuniary and non-pecuniary non-
deductible costs of education discourage education, as do tax evading possibilities for the
low-skilled. Progressive wage taxes might aﬀect the individual’s choice of educational type
when education is heterogenous, such that he chooses more of the education with the
higher non-pecuniary return. The total eﬀect of the tax system on educational attainment
in the society is ambiguous.
Finally, consider the question: Does the real-world 19-year old really consider the tax
system when making his educational decision? No. But he has a notion of the before and
after-tax overall wage levels in the society, as well as of the wage levels in diﬀerent profes-
sions. This gives him an impression of which lifetime income he can expect by acquiring
higher education. He holds this against the impression of what he will earn from other
sources should he not acquire education, both before and after tax. He also has an idea
of the future income risk. How much weight he puts on this future income risk depends
among other things on the level of welfare in the society. If there are good unemployment
insurance, health insurance, as well as disability insurance provided by the government,
this reduces the importance of the future income risk. Whether or not higher education is
publicly provided aﬀect the liquidity-constrained individual’s possibility to attend higher
education, as do the extent of subsidized student loans. The supply of educational insti-
tutions to some degree depends on the level of public financing, which in turn governs
the individual’s possibilities for education. So even though it is not likely that the young
individual includes the structure of the income tax as an important decision variable when
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making his educational choice, the tax system has a rather large indirect eﬀect on his
choice of education.
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